Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 63
Number 1 Law, Technology, and the
Organization of Work (Fall 2018)
2018

The Parallel Worlds of Guest Work and Gig Work
Leticia M. Saucedo
University of California, Davis School of Law, lmsaucedo@ucdavis.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Leticia M. Saucedo, The Parallel Worlds of Guest Work and Gig Work, 63 St. Louis U. L.J. (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol63/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

Article 8

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE PARALLEL WORLDS OF GUEST WORK AND GIG WORK

LETICIA M. SAUCEDO*
Work is stratified both in the brick-and-mortar world and in the gig
economy. While this observation may seem trite, it demands attention because
it may provide clues as to how methods of recruiting, hiring and maintaining a
workforce that are embedded in discriminatory practices carry over to the
independent contractor arrangements in gig work. In this Article, I compare the
evolution of working conditions in guest work to the conditions of workers in
the gig—also known as the platform—economy. Understanding the
commonalities is a first step to building bridges between workers in the brick
and mortar world and the gig world. Importantly, the demographics show that
immigrants are the foundation of independent contracting in both worlds.
For purposes of this Article, I define gig work as all forms of independent
contracting in which work is contracted on a temporary basis, whether monthly,
weekly, daily, or even hourly or by the minute. The temporariness of the work
is part of what makes the work precarious and the workers vulnerable. 1 These
workers are excluded from the protections of labor and employment laws, as
well as from the social benefit programs structured around employment,
including health insurance, pensions, unemployment insurances and workers’
compensation. 2 This definition also captures workers in both the brick-andmortar economy and in the gig economy. This is important because I want to
focus on the ways in which employer attitudes toward vulnerable workers in the
former affect the treatment of workers in the latter. This is also important
because gig work has grown in importance in the public imagination, if not in
actual numbers. 3 In the end, we are talking about the same workers, who straddle
the physical and virtual work worlds, even as the economy shifts.
* Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law. For their ideas, thoughts, comments and
encouragement I thank Jay Mootz, Luz Herrera, Mae Quinn, Kati Griffith, Shannon Gleeson,
Miriam Cherry, Matt Bodie, and the participants of the St. Louis University School of Law’s
Symposium on Law, Technology and the Organization of Work. This Article was written with
funding support from the Martin L. King Research Scholar program at U.C. Davis School of Law.
1. Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in
Transition, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 1 (2009); Miriam Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital
Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 578 (2016).
2. Id. at 581, 598.
3. See Annette Bernhardt & Sarah Thompson, What Do We Know About Gig Work in
California? An Analysis of Independent Contracting, U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (June 14, 2017),
119
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I. DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE GIG AND BRICK AND MORTAR WORLDS
A recent California-based study noted the diversity of independent
contractors, both in the brick and mortar and gig world:
[T]he demographics of the independent contractor workforce differ markedly
across the occupational spectrum. We find that women, immigrants, and Latinos
are disproportionately employed in what are typically lowwage [sic]
occupations, while White independent contractors are disproportionately
employed in what are typically higher-wage occupations. Clearly, more research
is needed to understand the variation in independent contractor work in
California, with a particular focus on identifying those occupations at risk of
economic insecurity and especially misclassification. 4

Platform gig workers tend to be lower income, male and younger. 5 A recent
Pew Research Center study found that participation in the platform economy is
more common among Blacks and Latinos. 6 About half of independent
contractors are workers of color, and they are more likely to be foreign-born. 7
This trend has actually been increasing over the past three decades. 8
Self-employment, or small business employment, has become a viable
livelihood among Latino immigrants. In fact, business ownership is higher
among the foreign-born than the native born in the United States. 9 Mexicans
comprise the largest group of immigrants who start businesses or are selfemployed in the United States, amounting to nearly a quarter of all immigrant
businesses. 10 More than half of these businesses are run by immigrants having a
high school degree or less, indicating that these businesses likely exist in
construction, agriculture, service and other low-skill sectors. 11 The majority of
immigrant businesses are unincorporated. 12
In fact, immigrants are driving entrepreneurship in states that encourage
such activity, including California. A recent study on the contributions of new
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/what-do-we-know-about-gig-work-in-california/ [https://perma.cc/
9PN4-LTRH].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Aaron Smith, Gig Work, Online Selling and Home Sharing, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov.
17, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/17/gig-work-online-selling-and-home-sharing/
[https://perma.cc/4J2N-5GMG].
7. See Bernhardt & Thompson, supra note 3.
8. MAGNUS LOFSTROM, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP AMONG
CALIFORNIA’S LOW-SKILLED WORKERS 6, 10 (Apr. 2010), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/re
port/R_410MLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJN5-EQPD].
9. Robert W. Fairlie & Magnus Lofstrom, Immigration and Entrepreneurship 11 (Inst. for
the Stud. of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 7669, 2013), http://ftp.iza.org/dp7669.pdf [https://perma.
cc/77J4-6RV6].
10. Id. at 12.
11. Id. at 14, 16.
12. Id. at 17.
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Americans in California concluded that immigrants in the state are
overrepresented in self-employment and small business. 13 A separate study
found that immigrants were almost twice as likely to start new businesses as the
native-born population. 14 Immigrants are overrepresented as entrepreneurs in
California, where they comprise thirty-eight percent of all entrepreneurs in the
state but only twenty-seven percent of the population. 15 Immigrants started
almost forty-five percent of new California businesses during the Great
Recession, between 2007 and 2011. 16 Immigrants contributed to the California
economy as entrepreneurs, small business persons, and self-employed
individuals both at the high and the low end of the skills spectrum. At the low
end, an estimated sixty percent of landscapers, seventy-two percent of
agricultural workers, seventy-six percent of garment workers, and sixty-four
percent of domestic workers are immigrants. 17 Immigrants tend to take the most
labor-intensive jobs in the economy, and they are overrepresented in those jobs.
Over ninety percent of sewing machine operators in California are immigrants,
for example. 18 At the high end of the skill spectrum, 56.5% of software
developers in California are immigrants. 19 Also at the high end of the skill
spectrum are company owners, including Elon Musk, founder of Tesla, and
Steven Chen and Jawed Karim, founders of YouTube. 20
Importantly, immigrants perceive greater freedom in small business or selfemployment opportunities because of the requirements for employment
authorization that exist in the wage market. Studies show that “increased
enforcement of employer sanctions against the hiring of unauthorized
immigrants in wage/salary employment may lead to higher self-employment

13. NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEW AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA
2 (2016), http://research.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ca-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MQA-TR6C].
14. Fairlie & Lofstrom, supra note 9, at 7.
15. NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 2.
16. Id. at 2–3
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Id.
20. NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 3; James Conca, Elon Musk—An African
Immigrant Changes the World, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2014, 4:44 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/jamesconca/2014/06/19/elon-musk-an-african-immigrant-changes-the-world/#5f16d84
33460 [https://perma.cc/M3LM-HTSQ]; John Cloud, How a Couple of Regular Guys Built a
Company that Changed the Way We See Ourselves, TIME (Dec. 25, 2006), http://content.time.com
/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570795-6,00.html [https://perma.cc/ZT69-4SKJ]; Jim Hopkins,
Surprise! There’s a Third YouTube Co-Founder, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2006, 10:41 PM), http://usa
today30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-11-youtube-karim_x.htm [https://perma.cc/BKM9-XA
95].
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rates.” 21 Independent contract work and self-employment have, therefore,
become default strategies for avoiding unauthorized employment, which runs
afoul of immigration law. 22 If independent contractors are not employees, the
thinking goes, they are not subject to rules for hiring or employing
undocumented workers. 23 This thinking converges with that of employers who
seek to avoid the regulation of employment laws that apply to the employment
relationship, but not to the contractor relationship. 24 Identifying as an
independent contractor, for example, allows an undocumented worker to provide
goods and services without being “knowingly hired” as an unauthorized alien
and without having to verify employment authorization through the federal
government’s verification system. 25
An Uber driver who has immigration constraints might choose independent
contractor status for its perceived freedom. Yet, this freedom is different from
what we typically think about in the gig economy. In the dominant narrative,
freedom is couched in terms of “freedom to:” to have flexibility in work hours,
to arrange work around family or other obligations, to set the terms and
conditions of one’s own employment, or to be one’s own boss. In the immigrant
worker context, it’s “freedom from:” from regulation outside the workplace that
affects one’s work status; from immigration enforcement in the workplace; and
from rules in the contract labor realm that limit wages, restrict conditions, and
restrict mobility. 26 Exploring the forms of employment arrangements allows us
to think about how best to protect precarious workers as new economic
arrangements emerge.
The gig economy takes its lead from how employers structured relationships
in the brick and mortar economy—especially after the Great Recession—to
incentivize independent contract or self-employment. 27 This is why the statistics
concerning immigrants and their overrepresentation in self-employment are so
revealing. They exemplify the ways in which employers take advantage of
vulnerability that stems from factors such immigration status, race, gender, or
socioeconomic status. For every Elon Musk at the high end of the skill spectrum,
there are thousands of immigrants at the low end, working through labor

21. NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 26 (citing Sarah Bohn & Magnus Lofstrom,
Employment Effects of State Legislation, in IMMIGRATION, POVERTY, AND SOCIOECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 298–302 (David Card & Steven Raphael eds., 2013)).
22. Bohn and Lofstrom, supra note 21 at 287.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 284–85, 287.
26. Cindy Carcamo, Immigrants Lacking Papers Work Legally – as Their Own Bosses, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/14/nation/la-na-ff-immigration-busi
ness-20130915 [https://perma.cc/K6K4-BAJW].
27. Steven Hill, Raw Deal: How the “Uber Economy” and Runaway Capitalism Are Screwing
American Workers 4–5 (2015).
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contractors, third-party contractors, or subcontractors in industries that are
thriving on their labor. 28
The concentration of Latinos and immigrants among low-wage independent
contractors is important because such a system is characteristic of low-quality
workplace conditions—often including the misclassification of employees as
independent contractors. Researchers note that, “[i]n low-wage occupations in
particular, workers such as janitors employed by subcontractors may be forced
to accept independent contractor status, even though they are clearly
employees.” 29
Many of the forms of social control that developed in the brick and mortar
economy exist for gig workers, albeit in more sophisticated and nuanced
versions. Looking to the treatment of workers in immigrant workplaces has
important consequences for predicting the areas of dispute for gig workers in
general. The next section of this Article describes the ways in which legislative
efforts to control temporary workers signal forms of control beyond those
available in traditional employment.
II. THE VULNERABILITY OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND WHAT IT SIGNALS FOR
GIG WORKERS
While immigrants are vulnerable in different ways, I focus here on the
vulnerabilities that are perpetuated in the low-skill guest worker program in the
United States. The most obvious vulnerability is guest workers’ temporary stay
in the United States, which is entirely dependent on continued work with an
employer sponsor.
A.

Guest Work and the AG Act of 2017

Under current immigration law, employers can hire temporary unskilled
foreign labor—guest workers—for jobs that are seasonal, short-term, and to fill
a temporary need of a company. 30 Examples of unskilled occupations eligible
for guest work include forestry, landscaping, housekeepers, amusement and
recreation attendants, service workers, poultry and meat processing workers, and
construction laborers. 31 Guest workers start from a position of vulnerability
because of parameters imposed by immigration law. In order to seek the services
of a guest worker under the immigration statute, the employer must certify that

28. See NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 6.
29. Bernhardt & Thompson, supra note 3.
30. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(B)
(2012).
31. H-2B Temporary Non-Agricultural Labor Certification Program – Selected Statistics, FY
2014 YTD, OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION (2014), https://www.foreignlaborcert.
doleta.gov/pdf/H-2B_Selected_Statistics_FY_2013_YTD_Q4_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S9K-5
DG2].
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there are no qualified, willing, and available U.S. workers for the job and that
the employment of a guest worker will not affect wages and working conditions
in the local market. 32 The guest worker is therefore confined under immigration
law to only a small subset of jobs for which these conditions are met. The
Department of Labor must certify that the employer is offering wages and
working conditions that would not discourage American workers from applying,
which means offering a wage equal to the prevailing wage. 33 Second, the guest
worker can only work for a temporary fixed period of time, currently less than
one year. 34 After that, the guest worker must return to her home country. 35 Most
importantly, the guest worker cannot move freely or easily from job to job if she
is dissatisfied with her employment relationship. 36 The freedom to exit is
circumscribed by provisions of the law that makes the guest worker deportable
if she leaves the employment relationship. 37 These factors make the guest
worker much more dependent on the employer—and therefore vulnerable—than
the prototypical employee.
Limitations on the employment rights of guest workers as demonstrate the
leverage employers have in industries that dominate the guest worker program.
The limitations, are, of course, not natural or endemic to the jobs or the industries
involved. We can see just how these limitations evolve by reviewing the ways
in which employers continue to seek restrictions on employee protections for
guest workers. Here is where things get worse, and at the same time demonstrate
how much power employers have over employees who are vulnerable in one
way or another.
The Agricultural Guestworker Act of 2017 (the “AG Act”) is a little-known
bill that promises to introduce new and even more restrictive forms of control
over guest workers. 38 I review it here because I want to demonstrate the aspects
of work that employers seek to control. The AG Act proposes to expand the
current guest worker program into industries outside of the traditional
agricultural and low-skill work. 39
The AG Act would authorize a dramatic expansion of the current guest
worker, or H-2 program, by creating a new category of visas for agricultural and
32. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(5)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) (2012).
33. 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(a) (2015).
34. 20 C.F.R. § 655.6 (2015); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(ii)(B) (2018).
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2012).
36. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D) (2018).
37. An employer must notify the immigration agency if an H-2B employee abandons
employment. Because the visa is contingent on employment, the H-2B employee will be considered
out of compliance with her visa and deportable. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(i)(B); Immigration and
Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2012).
38. AG Act, H.R. 4092, 115th Cong. (introduced October 23, 2017).
39. Compare H.R. 4092 § 2 (listing specific activities within the definition of “agricultural
labor or services” including forestry and aquaculture) with 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2018)
(having no specific definition for “agricultural labor or services”).
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food industry workers. Up to 450,000 visas would be available under a new H2C guest worker program. 40 By contrast, the current H-2A program accounted
for approximately 165,000 visas in 2016. 41 This visa program is envisioned as
the major source of labor for the food industry. 42 If employers were to reach the
450,000-visa cap, the proposed legislation would allow employers to seek
additional visas to ensure that employers are not vulnerable to labor shortages. 43
By locking in such a labor supply, employers shield themselves from possible
organizing efforts. They can also ensure workplace control over a broader
segment of their workers.
The AG Act will also affect existing labor efforts within the food industry.
The AG Act would authorize an expansion in the categories of jobs to include
aquaculture operations, dairies, raw (including meat and poultry) food
processors, and forestry-related industries. 44 Importantly, many of these are
industries have had long and successful histories of labor organizing. 45
Finally, the AG Act would expand the definition of temporary labor to three
years from the current ten months under the current program. 46 This means that
guest workers would be available for not just seasonal, but for year-round work.
While this would introduce a level of stability to the labor force in the food
industries, it also would expand the number of workers in the labor force who
are subject to severe restrictions on bargaining for better working conditions. 47
Most importantly, the bill would place legal restrictions on the employment
relationship that would necessarily create more vulnerable workers. First, the H2C program would not require employers to provide free transportation and
housing for workers, as the current program requires. 48 Second, under the H-2C
program, wages would be calculated as a function of the minimum wage, rather
40. H.R. 4092 § 3(d).
41. Philip Martin, The H-2A Farm Guestworker Program Is Expanding Rapidly: Here are the
Numbers You Need to Know, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2017, 5:54
PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/h-2a-farm-guestworker-program-expanding-rapidly [https://perma.
cc/P7DR-5ML7].
42. Kate Cox, Why Today’s Vote on H-2C Visas Is Food’s Biggest Labor Battle, THE NEW
FOOD ECON. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://newfoodeconomy.org/h2-c-visa-is-foods-biggest-labor-battle/
[https://perma.cc/TJQ8-LBCT].
43. H.R. 4092 § 3(d).
44. Id. at § 2.
45. Dairy, TEAMSTERS, https://teamster.org/divisions/dairy [https://perma.cc/8BC3-B3S7]
(last visited Aug. 31, 2018); Food Processing Division, TEAMSTERS, https://teamster.org/divi
sions/food-processing [https://perma.cc/ZB2T-ZJQN?type=image] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018);
About the USTFA, U.S. TROUT FARMERS ASS’N, https://ustfa.org/about-the-ustfa/ [https://perma.
cc/5RXA-395Z] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
46. H.R. 4092 § 3(a).
47. See id. at § 4.
48. H.R. JUDICIARY COMM., 115TH CONG., THE AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER ACT OF
2017,
https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/102017-AG-Act-OnePager.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KU2W-R3HN].
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than the higher prevailing wage. 49 Thus, the wages offered to H-2C workers
might be lower than those currently offered to guest workers, by law. Guest
workers under this program could make less than nine dollars per hour,
compared to the over thirteen dollars per hour that dairy workers now earn. 50
Third, the legislation redefines at-will employment for guest workers by
allowing the employer to terminate a worker, but not allowing a worker to quit
a job without losing legal status. 51 Fourth, under the proposed legislation, unlike
workers in other immigration categories, an H-2C worker does not have the right
to allow a spouse or children to accompany him or her. 52 This condition also
introduces a degree of vulnerability because it makes H-2C guest workers more
socially and geographically isolated—and perhaps less likely to seek permanent
workplace changes—than native-born workers.
Finally, with respect to employee voice, the Act would limit the methods by
which H-2C workers could complain or grieve their working conditions. First,
the legislation would require that H-2C workers seek mediation before filing a
civil action against an employer. 53 Second, the legislation would make
mandatory binding arbitration a condition of employment. 54 Third, the statute
would require workers to share the costs of mediation or arbitration of an
employment-related dispute. 55 A legislatively mandated arbitration procedure
would effectively limit concerted activity, class actions, and freedom of contract
for H-2C workers.
The AG Act would also limit the federal benefits available to these workers.
H-2C workers would not be eligible for earned income, child tax, or health care
premium credits. 56 More importantly, while H-2C workers would not be eligible
for insurance under the Affordable Care Act, they would nonetheless be required
to obtain their own health insurance as a condition of employment. 57 And, and
as a signal that these workers are not full members of the polity, employers
would also withhold ten percent of a worker’s wages and deposit them into a
fund only available in a U.S. embassy or consulate in the worker’s home country,
as a way to guarantee that workers return home. 58 Finally, while current H-2
workers can use federally-funded legal services to bring workplace complaints,
49. H.R. 4092 § 3(a).
50. Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/
minimumwage (last visited Aug. 30, 2018); May 2017 National Industry-Specific Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates, OCCUPATIONAL EMP’T STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/oes/
current/naics4_311500.htm [https://perma.cc/D7YS-EK8H] (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
51. H.R. 4092 § 3(b).
52. Id. at § 3(c).
53. Id. at § 4.
54. Id. at § 6.
55. Id.
56. H.R. 4092 § 7.
57. Id. at § 7(c).
58. Id. at § 3(a).
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H-2C workers would be barred from using federal legal aid for filing complaints
against employers. 59
The provisions of this proposed bill would regulate through the immigration
statute the very terms and conditions of employment that Congress contemplated
could be bargained for through contract or through concerted activity. 60 By
dictating terms and conditions for guest workers, and by limiting the avenues for
grievance, the H-2C program would effectively institutionalize subpar
conditions in the food industry. More importantly, the proposed restrictions on
employee rights signal the terms and conditions employers desire for the future.
The methods of control in the proposed legislation include control over work
time; control over the terms of the contract, including the term of the contract
and restrictions on moving to another employer; control over the treatment of
the worker outside the workplace (in the form of benefits limitations); and
intrusion on privacy and autonomy, to the extent the legislation disallows family
unification. 61
B.

How Guest Work Conditions Are Creeping into the Gig Economy

These methods of control are emerging as well in the gig economy, albeit in
refined and sophisticated forms. The proposed changes to guest work programs
mirror the evolution of the gig economy from an infrastructure of jobs that last
months, weeks, days or hours to jobs that last minutes or seconds. Amazon
Mechanical Turk and CrowdFlower are examples of the business model. Both
are algorithmic platforms that outsource work that computers cannot yet
master—facial recognition, for example—to humans who can do the work in
seconds or minutes and for pennies. 62 The business model, as described by the
Chief Executive Officer of CrowdFlower, sounds eerily similar to the rationale
for establishing a guest worker program under immigration law:
Before the Internet, it would be really difficult to find someone, sit them down
for ten minutes and get them to work for you, and then fire them after those ten
minutes. But with technology, you can actually find them, pay them the tiny
amount of money, and then get rid of them when you don’t need them
anymore. 63

59. H.R. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong., supra note 48.
60. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
61. See generally H.R. 4092.
62. Alana Semuels, The Internet is Enabling a New Kind of Poorly Paid Hell, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/01/amazon-mechanical-turk/
551192/ [https://perma.cc/2RF9-6ZDB].
63. Moshe Z. Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine, THE
NATION (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-crowdworkers-became-ghosts-dig
ital-machine [https://perma.cc/5QJP-EKXY].
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The comparisons do not end there. In the gig economy’s business model,
workers are increasingly like commodities in the same ways that guest workers
are increasingly expedient and fungible. Even though the forms of control are
not legislated—as they are for guest workers—they are just as effective.
In the guest work context, employers offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts, first
to U.S. workers and, if none are available or willing, then to guest workers.
Wages are set, as are other conditions of employment, such as the term of the
contract, the benefits provided, and the conditions for termination of the
contract. The hiring process for Amazon’s Mechanical Turk has been described
in similar ways:
Here’s how it works: the employers (called “Requesters”) can be actual humans
or a computer program running a script that automatically outsources any task it
cannot perform to the crowd. The Requesters place microtasks (called “Human
Intelligence Tasks,” or HITs) on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website and offer
non-negotiable contracts with a take-it-or-leave-it rate for each HIT. The
Turkers (officially called “Providers”) perform only small microtasks over and
over, rarely getting a glimpse of the whole. 64

Although guest workers are considered employees, many more immigrant
workers—especially undocumented workers—work as independent
contractors. 65 As such, they cannot avail themselves of the protections of labor
and employment laws. Gig workers face the same restrictions. The vast majority
are considered independent contractors. 66 The narrative of entrepreneurship is
strong in the gig and platform sectors and platform providers sell themselves as
marketplaces rather than employers. 67 As one scholar noted, the business model
in the platform economy is:
to operate powerful software applications (apps) designed to match consumers
who need a task done with entrepreneurs in search of their next ‘gig’. . . .
Upon closer inspection, however, it quickly emerges that many platforms
offer much more than mere matchmaking services: they are in the business of
digital work intermediation. To deliver tightly curated products and services to
customers, gig-economy operators actively shape the entire transaction by
means of close control over their workforce: from setting terms and conditions
and checking relevant qualifications, to ensuring proper performance and
payment. 68

64. Id.
65. Travis Putnam Hill, In Texas, Undocumented Immigrants Have No Shortage of Work,
TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 16, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/12/16/undocumentedworkers-finding-jobs-underground-econ/ [https://perma.cc/57XC-3KLJ].
66. See Semuels, supra note 62.
67. Jeremias Prassl, Humans as A Service: The Promise and Perils of Work in the Gig
Economy 5 (2018).
68. Id.
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Just as the terms and conditions of the contract control important aspects of
a guest worker’s life, so do algorithms surrounding the ratings of gig workers
who drive for Uber, dog-walk for Rover, or perform chores for TaskRabbit. The
algorithms that companies use do not simply aggregate the preferences of
customers and turn them into reputation ratings on a scale of one to five. 69
Algorithms monitor elements such as compliance with platform policies and
how often and how quickly a worker responds to accepts new tasks. 70 Uber, for
example, exercises control not through direct company policy, but through
strategies and algorithms that push drivers to take jobs even though they might
be unprofitable, and through gaming behavioral strategies such as pop-ups
encouraging drivers to continue driving when they signal they are ready to quit
for the day. 71
Just as a guest worker is paid only for the services provided, and many times
on a piece rate basis, the business model for the gig economy similarly requires
that workers are paid only for the time they work. Gig workers are also
responsible for the costs incident to their employment. Uber drivers, for
example, must pay for their own gas, insurance and car costs. 72 They must also
self-fund their health insurance and other benefits typically available through
work. 73
C. Challenging Work Arrangements at Both Ends of the Work Spectrum
Several scholars and authors have noted that the work arrangements of gig
workers are not that different from the types of workplace conditions of lowskill workers in the brick-and-mortar economy. 74 Work in both sectors of the
economy has been broken down into smaller and smaller tasks, which draws in
increasingly larger numbers of workers. 75 Interestingly, the gig economy is
drawing upon the same traditionally excluded groups that guest work programs
draw from: immigrants. 76 The innovation narrative hides the very risks that guest
work employers seek to avoid to shift to workers, including labor shortages,

69. Id. at 53–54.
70. Id. at 54.
71. Id. at 56.
72. Joann Weiner, The Hidden Costs of Being an Uber Driver, WASH. POST (February 20,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2015/02/20/the-hidden-costs-of-be
ing-an-uber-driver/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.32e0b5af3596 [https://perma.cc/6V3R-Q8F3].
73. Id.
74. HILL, supra note 27 at 2–4; PRASSL, supra note 67, at 72–77; Cherry, supra note 1, at 579;
Matthew W. Finkin, Beclouded Work, Beclouded Workers in Historical Perspective, 37 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 603, 604, 615 (2016); Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time
Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig Economy”, 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 480–81 (2016).
75. PRASSL, supra note 67 at 76–77.
76. Id. at 77.
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liability for employee benefits, and further regulation of the employment
relationship. 77
While the comparisons between work conditions in guest work and gig work
are striking, the comparison might also serve to reveal possible solutions to the
instability created in both fields. Understanding the potential vulnerability that
comes from an imbalance of power in the employment relationship, the federal
government guaranteed a minimum wage for guest workers. Currently, it is tied
to the prevailing wage in an industry, although the AG Act seeks to change it to
the minimum wage. 78 The AG Act would also guarantee a minimum amount of
work. 79 Because the same dynamic of instability exists in the gig economy,
similar measures would allow for decreased vulnerability in that sector. These
changes should occur at the federal labor and employment level so that those
laws evolve with the changes in the economy.
States, moreover, have begun to legislate protections for both immigrants
and gig workers, recognizing the special vulnerabilities of these workers. For
immigrant workers, California guarantees employment protections regardless of
immigration status. 80 Employers there cannot retaliate against employees
seeking workplace protections by threatening deportation. 81 Recently, the
California legislature passed a law guaranteeing overtime wage protection to
farmworkers—a category of employees not covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act and recognized as widely held by undocumented noncitizens in the state. 82
The goal of these laws is to remove incentives to hire vulnerable workers, either
as employees or independent contractors. Seattle passed an ordinance increasing
worker protections for transportation company drivers who were considered
independent contractors, although the Ninth Circuit recently allowed challenge
to the ordinance, filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to proceed on

77. Id. at 85–86.
78. 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(a) (2015); AG Act, H.R. 4092, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (introduced October
23, 2017).
79. H.R. 4092 § 3(a)
80. GABRIELA VILLAREAL, CAL. IMMIGRANT POL’Y CTR., THE CALIFORNIA BLUEPRINT:
TWO DECADES OF PRO-IMMIGRANT TRANSFORMATION 4–5 (2015), https://ncg.org/sites/default/
files/resources/The-California-Blueprint-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6DM-KQPF].
81. Andrew Khouri, More Workers Say Their Bosses Are Threatening to Have Them
Deported, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-immigra
tion-retaliation-20180102-story.html [https://perma.cc/4GWW-JBSS].
82. Jazmine Ulloa & John Myers, In Historic Move, Gov. Jerry Brown Expands Overtime Pay
for California Farmworkers, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016, 5:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/poli
tics/la-pol-sac-farmworkers-overtime-signed-20160912-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/RR3QNK3X]; Tamar Haspel, Illegal Immigrants Help Fuel U.S. Farms. Does Affordable Produce
Depend on Them?, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food
/in-an-immigration-crackdown-who-will-pick-our-produce/2017/03/17/cc1c6df4-0a5d-11e7-93
dc-00f9bdd74ed1_story.html?utm_term=.6011d41db0d6 [https://perma.cc/9ZA2-YWBK].
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antitrust grounds. 83 The holding demonstrates that efforts to rein in gig economy
overreach must be coordinated at state and federal levels.
The efforts of states also show the potential power of worker organization
to bring balance to the operating rules in the gig economy. Much of this
organizing will be done outside the confines of the National Labor Relations
Act, which restricts what unions can do within the collective bargaining
scheme. 84 For now, it must also be done within the confines of anti-trust law,
which restricts any form of collusion that might lead to price-fixing. 85 There is
an opportunity in this moment to consider strategies outside traditional labor
organizing, in large part because the nature of employment is shifting. State and
local organizing efforts can collaborate with state agencies, for example, to
define employment in a way that includes gig workers. Gig workers, moreover,
can file misclassification suits to achieve re-classification of their employment
status. Finally, both federal and state law can legislate conditions in the gig
economy, in much the same way that guest work regulation has developed the
contours of guest work. Once we realize that the innovation narrative is not, in
fact, innovative, we can start to build alliances across brick-and-mortar and
virtual platform work to achieve leverage—and rights—for workers across the
spectrum.
***
Eric Posner and Glen Weyl recently floated a proposal that called for
creating visas under a program they call the Visas Between Individuals
Program. 86 The program would allow individuals to sponsor immigrants, who
would agree to work for the sponsor for an agreed upon wage and period of time,
not to exceed three years. 87 Sponsors could then hire out those immigrants, or
pay them less than minimum wage to work directly for individuals to pay back
the cost of the visa sponsorship. 88 The idea would be that individuals in the
United States would receive benefits that corporations and businesses currently
receive under existing temporary work programs. The proposal, smacking of
indentured servitude, would allow individuals to sponsor their own immigrants
indefinitely to work on projects as individuals see fit. 89 Essentially, sponsors
would act as intermediaries, hiring out workers to employers looking for, much
like labor contractors in guest worker programs, or like platform employers in

83. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 776–77, 795 (9th Cir. 2018).
84. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012) (restricting the
activities of unions as collective bargaining representatives).
85. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 780.
86. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy
for a Just Society 150 (2018).
87. Id. at 149–54.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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the platform economy claim to be. 90 In the future of work that Posner and Weyl
imagine, the humanity of the immigrant is erased. Jeremias Prassl warns that
considering humans as cogs at the service of the platform economy puts us
another step closer to the complete commodification of workers. 91 This Article
has emphasized the conditions of vulnerability that make for an easier transition
to the work world that both Prassl and Posner and Weyl predict. Importantly, the
dehumanization of workers is much easier if they are hired for shorter and
shorter periods of time. This is what makes the parallel between the guest worker
program’s evolution and the platform economy so apt. In both worlds, workers
are seen as a piece of the production process that must be managed. In the case
of guest workers and increasingly, immigrants in the gig economy, that they are
foreign-born might facilitate the dehumanization process. The role of
government requires that we re-humanize work, by recognizing that all workers,
including short-term employees or independent contractors, deserve protections
in the workplace no matter how short their gigs might be.

90. Id. at 154.
91. PRASSL, supra note 67, at 4.

